摘要
建立了由一个制造商和两个供应商组成的二级供应链的质量改进激励模型,并通过Stackelberg博弈分析了制造商最优激励系数以及供应商最优质量风险防范水平的确定.分析结果表明,效益转移激励模型能够促进供应链质量的改进及制造商收益的提高.最后给出数值算例证明了模型的有效性.
An incentive model is developed for the analysis of quality improvement of a two-layer supply chain,with a manufacturer and two suppliers.The optimal incentive coefficient of the manufacturer and the optimal quality risk prevention levels of suppliers are analyzed using Stackelberg game.Analysis result shows that the quality of supply chain can be improved and manufacturer＇s revenue can be increased by benefit transfer incentive model.Finally,the effectiveness of the model is demonstrated by a numerical case.
出处
《哈尔滨理工大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2011年第6期114-117,123,共5页
Journal of Harbin University of Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(70771065)
国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)重点项目(2009AA043000
2009AA043001)
