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风险评估不一致下服务外包交易达成机制 被引量:2

Incentive mechanism of service outsourcing based on risk assessment of customer and supplier
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摘要 针对服务外包中接发包风险评估往往不一致,导致双方很难达成外包交易的问题,建立了服务外包交易Nash讨价还价模型,分析了风险评估不一致下的交易达成区间。就客户风险评估小于服务商和大于服务商两种情况,分别提出了客户预付款交易机制和服务商赔偿承诺交易机制。研究表明,两种机制均能增加交易达成区间,提高双方的期望收益。 The buyers and suppliers were hardly in a position to conclude the outsourcing transaction caused by discord packing risk assessment in service outsourcing.To solve this problem,a Nash bargaining model was constructed,and the feasibility of cooperation sections was analyzed based on risk assessment of buyer and supplier.Customer down-payment incentive and facilitator compensation incentive were proposed respectively under two circumstances of customer risk assessment less than or greater than facitilitator.The conclusion implied that the cooperation could be reinforced as well as the expected profit of supplier and buyer would be increased under both two incentives.
出处 《计算机集成制造系统》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2011年第10期2263-2269,共7页 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128)~~
关键词 服务外包 机制设计 风险评估 Nash讨价还价 交易机制 service outsourcing mechanism design risk assessment Nash bargaining incentive mechanism
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