期刊文献+

基于多权重Shapley值的联盟利益分配机制 被引量:35

The Profit Allocation of Alliances Based on the Multi-weighted Shapley Value
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 利益分配机制是影响联盟合作成功的关键因素。传统的含权Shapley值模型在解决联盟利润分配问题时,仅从联盟整体的角度赋予成员单一的权重,而忽视了成员在不同联盟活动中可能存在议价能力和贡献的差异。为此,提出一种多权重Shapley值模型,以反映成员在多项联盟活动中的不同权重。通过对联盟合作对策进行Shapley等价分解,得到由若干个简单对策组成的对策集合。在简单对策的基础上,根据成员在实质联盟中的地位作用、议价能力和潜在风险等因素,分别为每个简单对策联盟建立适当的权重向量。这意味着,参与了多项联盟活动的成员将被包含在多个简单对策中,同时被赋予多个权重。在此基础上,进一步给出了多权重Shapley值的计算公式。最后对Shapley值模型和多权重Shapley值模型进行了数值模拟,并对计算结果作了比较。 Profit allocation is the key to the success of cooperation in alliances.In addressing issues of profit allocation in alliances,the previously proposed weighted Shapley value assigns only one weight to each player for all activities in an alliance.However,a player may have different bargaining power and contribution in different activities.Hence,it is more appropriate that a player is associated with different weights in different activities.This article tries to propose a new model called multi-weighted Shapley value.In the model,a cooperative n-person game is decomposed into a new set of simple games in the sense of Shapley-equivalence.Each simple game is associated with a vector of weights determined by roles,contribution,bargaining power and potential risk of players.It implies that a player who involves in multiple activities will be included in several simple games and assigned with multiple weights.Based on the weights,an equation is further built to calculate the multi-weighted Shapley value.In the end,an example is presented to illustrate how the Shapley value and the multi-weighted Shapley value work.
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2011年第4期79-84,91,共7页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(70973038 71073057) 教育部人文社科青年基金(10YJC630042)
关键词 联盟 利益分配 SHAPLEY值 多权重Shapley值 合作对策 alliance profit allocation shapley value multi-weighted shapley value cooperative games
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

  • 1吕海萍,龚建立,王飞绒,卫非.产学研相结合的动力—障碍机制实证分析[J].研究与发展管理,2004,16(2):58-62. 被引量:85
  • 2Shapley L S. A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (Ed.), Contributions to the theory of games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28)[M]. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953:307-317.
  • 3Shapley L S. Additive and non-additive set functions[D]. PhD Thesis, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University, 1953.
  • 4Winter E. The Shapley value. In.. Aumann RJ, Hart S(Ed. ), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3 [M]. North Holland, 2002: 2025-2054.
  • 5Kalai E, Samet D. On Weighted Shapley Values [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1987,16 : 205-222.
  • 6Owen G. A note on the Shapley value [J]. Management Science, 1968,14(11): 731-732.
  • 7Owen G, Multilinear extensions of games [J]. Management Science, 1972,18(5): 64-79.
  • 8Guillaume Haeringer. A new weight scheme for the Shapley value[J]. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2006,52 (1) : 88-98.
  • 9姜启源.数学模型[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2001..
  • 10汪贤裕,肖玉明.博弈论及其应用[M].北京:科学出版社.2008:94-96.

二级参考文献3

共引文献161

同被引文献358

引证文献35

二级引证文献158

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部