摘要
本文同时考虑财政分权、政治晋升和腐败三个因素对地方官员行为的影响,进而构建了理论模型。从中得到的主要结论是,在基本模型中,地方官员对政治晋升的偏好程度越高,则其努力程度越高、腐败程度越低。而财政分权程度越高,官员的努力也越高,但对腐败水平影响却是不确定的。在进一步假设腐败会被惩罚的拓展模型中,基本模型的大部分结论都没有发生太大变化,只是分权程度的对努力的影响也变得不确定了。除此之外,我们进一步研究了,对官员腐败惩罚的力度和对官员腐败的惩罚准确程度的影响,相关命题表明,如果对官员腐败惩罚的越严厉,并且对官员腐败的惩罚越准确,官员努力水平和官员腐败程度都会变低。通过对研究结论的分析,我们还对以往文献的结果进行了重新解释。
In this paper, we attempt to consider the fiscal decentralization, political promotion and corruption simultaneously and build a unified mathematical model. The main conclusion is that, in the basic model, the higher the local officials＇ preferences to political promotion, the higher the level of their effort and the lower the level of corruption. The higher the degree of fiscal decentralization, the higher the level of the officials＇ efforts, but the impact on the level of corruption is uncertain. Further, we expand the model by assuming that corruption will be punished. In this expanded mode, most of the conclusions of the basic model have not changed much, but the impact of the decentralization degree on efforts become uncertain. In addition, we further study the impact of the intensity and the accuracy of punishment. The related proposition shows that, more severe and more accurate the punishment of official corruption, both the level of official effort and corruption will be lower. Through the analysis of the proposition, we also explain the results of previous literature.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第5期12-19,共8页
Economic Review
基金
教育部人文社科基地重大项目(2009JJD790020)"政府的组织结构
激励与经济增长"
辽宁大学211项目(三期)"中国改革与增长新政治经济学"和辽宁大学亚洲研究中心项目"地方官员行为与经济发展研究"资助
关键词
政治晋升
财政分权
腐败
Political Promotion
Fiscal Decentralization
Corruption
Economic I）evelopment
