摘要
本文通过理论模型解释我国房地产市场"两难困境"的内在机制,提出各参与主体的博弈行为与房地产泡沫的制度逻辑:一方面地方政府土地出让和开发商的垄断造成房价过高;另一方面地方政府投资又依赖于土地出让收入。中央政府面临两者之间的权衡。本文提出,地方政府的利益是地价和房价上涨的根本原因,开发商垄断是高地价和高房价的直接原因。我们认为,大力建设保障性住房,并发展高端房市场是解决房地产市场两难处境的有效手段。
Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, the paper explains the dilemma of China＇s real estate market ： on the one hand land auctions conducted by local governments and the oligopoly of developers have pushed up house prices, and on the other hand, local governments heavily rely on the land auction revenues to sustain investment-oriented economic growth. The central government faces the trade-off between the welfare of house buyers and the investment demand of local governments. The authors argue that the oligopoly of developers is the direct cause of high prices of rising house prices, and local government incentives are the fundamental cause of that. Finally, the paper proposes that building more low-income and affordable housing while developing the high-end market would be an effective solution to the problem. Stringent regulation and rational planning would be essential in order to meet the housing demand of low-to-middle income families.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期73-93,共21页
Journal of Financial Research
