摘要
研究模型分析了当不同管理形态的公司需要增资时会计师的审计及独立董事的监督功能。研究结果显示,经理人经营时,独立董事较易维持独立性;建立及落实公司治理,会计师及独立董事皆能降低投资人与企业家或经理人之间的信息不对称,故会计师的审计功能与独立董事的监督功能具有替代关系;企业家期中增资后持股比率高于期初持股比率,且会计师及独立董事较高的报酬是企业家选择对投资人不利的投资方案的信号。
The research model analyzes the function of auditors and independent directors in the enterprises with different management types that must be funded by equity capital.This study is derived from the equilibrium condition and supported by game theory,and to understand the strategy choice of the enterprisers or managers,auditors and independent directors.The main results are： When an enterprise is operated by the manager,it can impel the independent director to maintain independence.The more the effects of corporate governance are,especially the function of auditors and independent directors,the more the asymmetric information problem between the investors and enterprisers or managers is solved.There is a substituted relation between the auditors and independent directors.If the enterpriser＇s stockholding rate after funding is more than the stockholding rate at the beginning,and auditor＇s fee and independent director＇s payoff are high,it is the signal that the enterpriser chooses the unfavorable investment project for investors.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期81-88,共8页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
管理形态
会计师
独立董事
公司治理
博弈理论
management types
accountants
independent directors
corporate governance
game theory
