摘要
企业将非核心业务外包已成为当今市场竞争的一种手段和趋势。以第三方物流集配中心参与下的供应链为背景,针对制造商对第三方物流集配中心服务的监督,提出了一种服务契约并进行了分析,研究了不同参数的变化对制造商期望收益的影响。结论表明,这一契约可以形成一种有效的内在激励机制,激励第三方物流集配中心努力地工作;制造商需要根据外在因素,控制和调整自身监督力度,选择最优的监督力度使其期望收益的增加最大化。
Non-core business process outsourcing has been the trend of enterprise in market competition.Focusing on the supervision of manufacturer to Third-Party Logistics（3PL） distribution center under a supply chain,a service contract was designed with principal-Agent theory.According to the analysis of service contract,effect of different parameters＇ variation on manufacturer＇s expected revenue was studied.The conclusion implied that an effective incentive mechanism could be formed by this service contract,which stimulated 3PL distribution center to work harder,at the same time manufacturers＇ expected revenue would be maximized through the first best effort level of manufacturer,which controlled and adjusted its supervision according to external factors.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第12期2736-2741,共6页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
关键词
服务外包
契约设计
制造商监督
第三方物流
集配中心
委托代理
供应链
service outsourcing
contract design
manufacturer＇s supervision
third-party logistics
distribution center
principal-Agent
supply chains
