非正式契约与正式契约交互关系研究——基于随机匹配博弈的分析被引量：24

Interaction between formal contracts and informal contracts under random-matching game

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摘要在商业交易中,正式契约安排与非正式契约安排往往是同时使用的,对这两类契约交互作用的分析是契约理论研究的一个新领域.运用随机匹配博弈建立一个契约成本影响契约选择和契约交互关系的模型,将契约交互关系研究从双边重复博弈框架扩展到随机匹配博弈框架下,从而可用其来分析非频繁交易.结论是:当契约成本较低时,正式契约的引入替代了非正式契约;当契约成本处于中间水平时,正式契约补充了非正式契约;当契约成本很高时,正式契约的引入不影响交易方对非正式契约的选择.最后,运用上述模型分析了网上拍卖中第三方执行中介的介入对契约交互关系的影响. Formal contracts and informal arrangements are always jointly used in business. The relationship between formal contract and informal contract is a new topic in contract theory. This paper builds a random matching game model to analyze the influence of formal contract on informal contract when formal contract is available, and therefore extend the research on interaction of informal contract and formal contract from two-sided repeated game to random matched game. The conclusion is that contracting cost affects contract choice and the interaction between formal contract and informal contract. When contracting cost is low, the introduction of formal contract substitutes informal contract ; when contracting cost is medium, formal contract complements informal contract; when contract cost is high, the introduction of formal contract does not affect informal contract. Finally, the model is used to analyze the effect of the introduction of the third intermediaries on informal contract in online auction trade.

作者吴德胜李维安

机构地区南开大学公司治理研究中心南开大学商学院

出处《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期76-85,共10页 Journal of Management Sciences in China

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802030) 天津市2008社科规划资助项目(TJGL08-079)

关键词随机匹配博弈正式契约非正式契约契约成本网上拍卖 random-matching game formal contract informal contract contracting cost online auction

分类号 F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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