摘要
本文通过研究企业集团内部资本市场与上市公司资本投资的关系,考察了大股东的掏空和支持行为对上市公司资本投资决策的影响,并重点探寻了异质的产权性质镶嵌于这一资本配置过程中所蕴涵的治理效应。以2001—2006年附属于企业集团的上市公司为研究对象,我们发现,大股东的掏空和支持行为总体上与上市公司的资本投资存在显著的关联性。进一步的分析显示,国有企业集团内部资本市场的资本配置功效表现出一定的两面性,而民营企业集团的内部资本市场已在某种程度上异化为利益输送的渠道。本文的研究表明,大股东的内部资本市场运作可能在不同的产权特征或特定动机下展现出迥异的"光明面"与"黑暗面"。
This paper studies the impact of large shareholder＇s tunneling and propping behavior on listed company＇s capital investment decision through investigating the relationship between business group＇s internal capital markets and the listed company＇s capital invest- ment. We focus on the role of property rights played on the group＇s internal capital markets＇capital allocation effect. Based on listed companies of group-affiliation from 2001-- 2006, we find that there is a significant correlation between large shareholder＇s tunneling and propping behavior and the listed company＇s capital investment on the whole. Further analysis shows that state-owned business group＇s internal capital markets display a dual nature to some extent： On the one hand, the state-owned shareholders＇ propping behavior aggravate the listed company＇s overinvestment; On the other hand, the propping behavior of the local stateowned business group can effectively alleviate the underinvestment in listed companies. Alternatively private business group＇s tunneling behavior can not only in- crease underinvestment, while their propping behavior can not really ease the financing con- straints of listed companies, revealing the private business group＇s internal capital markets have dissimilated into the channels of benefits transfer to a certain extent. Research results in this paper imply that large shareholder＇s internal capital markets, under various property features or specific motivation, may reveal a widely different ＂bright side＂ or ＂dark side＂.
出处
《中国会计评论》
CSSCI
2010年第2期201-222,共22页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70772100
70902030)
教育部博士点基金项目(教技发中心函[2006]226号)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630242)
重庆大学自主科研项目(CDJSK100063)的资助
关键词
内部资本市场
掏空
支持
资本投资
投资效率
Internal Capital Markets, Tunneling, Propping, Capital Investment, Invest ment Efficiency
