期刊文献+

不同情境下搭便车行为的改变——基于实验数据的研究 被引量:7

The Demonstration Analysis of the Effect of FDI on Industry Structure Conversion in China
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摘要 本文对Leuthold设计的L-D实验进行了改进,在原来单一情景基础上增加了两种不同的情景,即将初始资金100元与初始资金1万元和100万元情境下进行的实验进行对比分析,目的在于探究搭便车行为随投资总额变化的关系。经过近3年的时间一共选取了148份有效实验数据,经过计算得到了三种情境下的搭便车指数(FreeRiderIndex,缩写为FRI)分别为52.03%、64.56%、70.88%。实验结果证明当投资总额显著增大时,投资者搭便车的行为越严重,越倾向于风险厌恶,因搭便车行为而导致的集体利益损失程度也越大。本文进一步验证了Marwell和Ames设计的M-A实验得到的自愿投入私人账户的比率在40%-60%之间的结论,证实了L-D实验得出女性FRI值均高于男性FRI值的结论。 This paper improved Mr. Leuthold's free rider experiment,adding two kinds of different circumstances to initial one. It compared and analyzed three tests that each had initial capital of 100 RMB, 10000 RMB, and 1 million RMB, to probe into the relationship between free rider behavior and total investment. After nearly 3 years' effort, we acquired 148 valid experimental data samples, and calculated the index of free rider,52.03% ,64.56% ,70.88% respectively. The results showed that investors' free rider behavior was more serious when investment capital significantly increased ,and at the same time investors were inclined to risk aversion. The collective revenue also faced a greater extent of losses. Our experiment also testified Marwell and Ames'standpoint that the ratio of voluntary investment in individual account was 40% to 60% ,and simultaneously confirmed Leuthold's viewpoint that female free -rider- index was higher than male.
出处 《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第7期158-164,共7页 China Soft Science
关键词 搭便车 投资风险 搭便车指数 实验经济学 free rider investment risk free rider index experimental economics
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参考文献12

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共引文献26

同被引文献86

  • 1张维迎,柯荣住.信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,37(10):59-70. 被引量:1085
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  • 3赵鼎新.集体行动、搭便车理论与形式社会学方法[J].社会学研究,2006(1):1-21. 被引量:201
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  • 6樊纲、王小鲁(2010):《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年度报告》,经济科学出版社.
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