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南水北调东线工程运营管理的演化博弈及策略研究 被引量:11

Evolutionary Game and Policy Study on Operation Management of the Eastern Route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project
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摘要 基于社会责任和经济效益的双重视角,论文运用演化博弈理论分析了南水北调东线工程运营管理中政府主体和公司主体的复制动态方程以及进化稳定策略,并进行了稳定性分析,最后结合工程运营管理的实务,提出了相应的应对策略。研究表明:①政府主体和公司主体之间的演化博弈,存在两个演化稳定策略(ESS):(LS,HE)和(HS,LE),而(HS,LE)是期望的系统演化方向;②为了使得系统向(HS,LE)方向演化,必须要使得公司主体让出部分资源和产能给政府主体用于履行社会责任,上级政府在南水北调东线运营管理中要起到宏观指导和中观管制作用,要优先保障水安全,优先履行社会责任,预防和治理洪旱灾害和水污染灾害,积极推进节水机制,在此前提下考虑经济效益的实现,从而达到社会责任和经济效益双赢的局面。 Based on double angles of social responsibility and economical benefit, this paper examines the evolutionary game (EG) between government agents and corporation agents involved in the eastern route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project, and analyzes replicator dynamics and its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). In addition, stability analysis was performed. The operation management policy, accounting for the project practice of operation and management was proposed. It was suggested that: 1) the EG between government agents and corporation agents has two ESSs: (LS, HE) and (HS, LE), in which (HS, LE) is the expected evolutionary direction; and 2) for the system evolving to (HS, LE), corporation agents should transfer some resources and capacity to government agents, and the superior government should guide and control the operations and management of SNWD, keeping water safety and performing social responsibility first, including preventing and address floods, droughts and pollution, and promoting water saving mechanisms. Then, they can consider economical benefits. It could achieve win-win between social responsibility and economical benefit by this strategy. As to operation practice of the SNWD, three policy recommendations are given: 1) the government agents relevant to Jiangsu and Shandong Water Resources Department (WRD), The SNWD office acts as a control role. The WRD should own more authority, resources and capacity to implement social responsibility. That is, the WRD should make flood, drought, and pollution disaster contingency plans, establish a sound water market emergency management system, guarantee the safety of water resource projects, handle and control flood, drought and pollution disasters, and undertake corresponding monitoring, forecasting, emergency response, disposal and control of post-disaster reconstruction, maintenance and restoration work; 2) the WRD should actively promote water-saving mechanisms to coordinate the relationship between water diversion and water saving, with the objective to improve comprehensive utilization of water resources through flexible use of the water pricing policy and corresponding water-saving incentives under the pricing macro-guidance of the country; and 3) the corporation agents represent Jiangsu Shuiyuan Corporation (JSC) and Shandong Ganxian Corporation (SGC). Under the premise of water security, JSC and SGC can take into account economic benefits and maintain a low-profit status. When the SNWD runs in a normal state (e.g., no flood, drought and pollution disasters), JSC and SGC can maintain an appropriate profit through water resources regulation and market transactions. In the contrast, when the SNWD runs in an abnormal state, JSC and SGC, cooperating with the WRD, should implement flood control, drought prevention and pollution control. In this case, corresponding costs from the emergency response should be fully subsidized by the government WRD to decrease economic loss in the emergency.
出处 《资源科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2010年第8期1563-1569,共7页 Resources Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(编号:70471083 90924027) 教育部新世纪优秀人才计划项目(编号:NCET-0600481) 江苏省2009年度普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(编号:CX09B_057R)
关键词 南水北调东线 运营管理 演化博弈 SNWD Operation management Evolutionary game
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参考文献24

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