摘要
在某些情形下,审计风险并非始终随着审计证据的引入而降低。管理层和审计师的舞弊博弈模型分析结果表明:重大错报风险与审计证据的不规则关系出现于管理层有强烈的舞弊激励、管理层的舞弊行为被揭露所遭受的惩罚不严厉以及审计师收集证据的信息含量较低或具有误导性等情形;在舞弊博弈中,检查风险始终随着审计证据的引入而增大的基本动因在于管理层和审计师博弈过程中战略的互相影响;审计师法律责任比率通过影响重大错报风险的大小来影响审计风险与审计证据之间的变动关系;在特定条件下职业谨慎对于重大错报风险、审计风险与审计证据之间的不规则关系具有"放大效应"。
Audit risk does not always decrease with the introduction of audit evidence. The results of the analysis of fraud game model be- tween management and auditors are as follows ： （ I ） the irregular relationship between material misstatement risk and audit evidence ex- isis when the management has a strong incentive to commit fraud and the discipline for the management fraud behavior is not severe and signals observed by the auditors are not informative and so on ; （2） the fundamental driving force for the risk detection increases with the introduction of audit evidence being the strategic interaction between management and auditors ; （ 3 ） material misstatement risk which de- pends on the auditor＇s legal liability ratio affects the relationship between audit risk and audit evidence, so the auditor＇s legal liability ra- tio can affect the relationship; （4） in some circumstances, professional care enlarges the regular relationship between the material mis- statement risk, audit risk and the audit evidence, that is ＂magnifying effect＂,
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期21-28,36,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
山东财政学院校级课题(07YB08)
关键词
审计证据
审计风险
不规则关系
舞弊博弈
audit evidence
audit risk
irregular relationship
fraudulent game
