摘要
本文以地方政府、辖区企业与商业银行的三角关系构建理论框架,探索上市公司政治联系的产生及其对企业长期借款的影响。我们构建了政治联系的两个替代变量:地方上市公司数量与上市公司的经济影响力。以2002—2006年A股上市公司的经验数据作为样本,实证研究表明,地方上市公司数量越少,上市公司的经济影响力越大,则企业政治联系的程度越紧密,长期借款比例越高。进一步研究还发现,上市公司的经济影响力与获得长期信用借款的可能性、长期信用借款比例正相关。
By constructing the conceptual framework based on the triangle of local governments, regional firms and commercial banks, we explore the origin of listed firms＇ political connection and its effect on corporate long-term loan. In Chinese system of financial federalism with political centralization, the central government examines the achievement of local governments based on regional GDP and financial revenues. Therefore, the political promotion of government officials depends on the development of regional firms. There are two types of firms, unlisted firms and listed firms. Compared with unlisted firms, listed firms are more efficient and attract more economic resources flow, creating ＂extra contribution＂ for the local government. When the number of regional listed firms is fewer and the economical effect （its revenue/regional GDP） of a listed firm is stronger, the local government relies on ＂extra contribution＂ more heavily, so the listed firm and the local government is more connected, which means its political connection is closer. Therefore, the two factors could proxy for political connection. Besides, local governments could influence commercial banks＇ lending decisions. The weak financial environment, including the imperfect legislation and credit rules, gives rise to the need of ＂invisible guarantee＂ from local governments for banking loans. Then, lenders form rational expectation： The more politieally connected is the listed firm, the more ＂invisible guarantee＂ is provided by local governments, and the less is the default risk. It means that political connection substitutes for the weak judiciary for guaranteeing the enforcement of debt contract. Because long-term loan is more risky than short-term loan, it needs political connection more. Therefore, political connection could make corporate longterm loan easier. On the basis of empirical data, we find that a listed company could get more long-term loan as the number of regional listed firms decreases and its economical effect increases, because the two factors could affect firms＇ political connection. The conclusion is robust in sensitivity checks. Moreover, firms＇ economical effect is positively correlated with the probability of obtaining credit long-term loan and the ratio of credit long-term loan, but we fail to find the number of regional listed firms＇ effect on the type of long-term loan.
出处
《中国会计评论》
CSSCI
2010年第1期31-52,共22页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"产权保护导向的会计控制研究"(70532003)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"审计市场资源配置与审计师行为研究"(05JA790085)
广东省自然科学基金项目"审计师行为与审计供求关系:基于中国审计市场的检验"(05301040)的阶段性研究成果
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划(编号NCET-07-0882)"的资助
关键词
上市公司数量
经济影响力
政治联系
长期借款比例
信用借款
The Number Of Regional Listed Companies, Economical Effect, Political Connection, Debt Maturity, Credit Long-Term Loan
