摘要
以DD模型计量的信息风险为研究切入点,通过信息不对称理论和风险管理理论分析,提出债权人长期借款将依据信息风险程度的观点。研究结果表明,债权人能有效地对上市公司的高固有信息风险进行降低长期借款比例的调整。与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司的信息风险对长期借款的影响为显著正相关,但这种反向选择主要表现在债权人对国有上市公司的可操纵信息风险,且仅存在于政府干预强的制度环境中。
Taking the information risk of the DD model measurement as the entry point for the study and through the analysis of the information asymmetry theory and the risk management theory, this paper puts forward the viewpoint of the long-term loans of the creditors depending on the degree of the informa- tion risks. The results of the study show that the creditor can effectively carry out the adjustment of lower- ing the proportion of long-term loans against the higher inherent information risk of the listed companies. Compared with non-state-owned listed companies, the impact of the information risks of the state-owned listed companies on long-term loans is significantly positive-correlated; while this kind of negative selection is mainly reflected on the manipulative information risks of the state-owned listed companies by the creditors, which only exists in the institutional environment with strong government intervention.
出处
《江西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期19-28,共10页
Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于循环经济理念的社会责任会计体系创新研究"(70872110)
关键词
信息风险
固有信息风险
可操纵信息风险
企业长期借款
information risk
inherent information risk
manipulative information risk
businesslong-term loans
