摘要
技术交易的重要特征之一是交易前后存在相关的产品竞争市场,该市场会与技术市场发生战略性互动,并最终影响到技术竞买者的竞价行为以及交易的效率。基于这一特征,本文构建了一个技术交易的不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过考察技术竞买者的均衡竞价策略,分别从专利权人期望收益和资源配置两个角度分析了技术交易的效率。研究结果表明,竞买者为了在后续产品竞争中获取竞争优势而存在通过竞价传递其私有信息的动机,这使得标准的均衡竞价行为发生改变,从而影响了专利权人的期望收益,同时导致了交易的无效配置技术资源的可能性。
An important characteristic of technology exchange is that there exists relative product competitive market before and after exchange which will interact strategically with the auction market,ultimately affecting potential buyers＇ bidding,hence the efficiency of auction mechanisms.Basing on the characteristic,this paper builds up an incomplete dynamic game of technology exchange.By examining firms＇ equilibrium bidding strategies,we analyze the efficiency of exchange from viewpoints of patent holders＇ expected revenues and allocative efficiency.It is shown that standard bidding behaviors are modified by the incentives to signal private information for an advantage in following competition,which affects patent holders＇ expected revenues and simultaneously leads to possibility of inefficacy of auction in allocating technology.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期79-83,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词
技术交易
效率
产品市场竞争
信号传递
technology exchange
efficiency
product market competition
signaling
