期刊文献+

供应链中供应商订单分配的不完全信息动态博弈研究 被引量:16

Dynamic Game Study on the Incomplete Information about Order Distribution of Suppliers in Supply Chains
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 针对制造商和供应商之间的不完全信息动态博弈问题,根据供应商提供的质量、交货期和价格等数据,建立了供应商选择过程中的不完全信息动态博弈模型和奖惩机制,通过判断供应商提供数据的真伪性,对供应商的订单分配问题进行了研究,并用算例验证了所建立模型和奖惩机制的可行性。 The information quality level,delivery timelevel rewards and punishment were distribution of suppliers was example. between suppliers and and price the suppliers established. The data discussed. The game manufacture is inc offered ,the game omplete. On the basis of the model and the mechanism of offered by suppliers were judged and the order model and mechanism were validated by an example.
出处 《管理学报》 2006年第5期519-523,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272043)
关键词 供应链管理 供应商选择 不完全信息动态博弈 supply chain management supplier selection incomplete information dynamic game
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

  • 1[1]Henk D V,Smaniotto R,Elsas D A.Reciprocal Altruism Under Conditions of Partner Selection[J].Rationality and Society,2001,13(2):139-183.
  • 2邵晓峰,黄培清,季建华.供应链中供需双方合作批量模型的研究[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(2):54-57. 被引量:67
  • 3袁锋,陈晓剑,朱宁.信号传递与R&D合作伙伴的选择[J].中国软科学,2004(11):110-113. 被引量:7
  • 4[4]WU Naiqi,SU Ping.Selection of Partners in Virtual Enterprise Paradigm[J].Robotics and Computer Integrated Manufacturing,2005,21 (2):119-131.
  • 5[5]Ip W H,HUANG M,YUNG K L,et al.Genetic Algorithm Solution for a Risk-based Partner Selection Problem in a Virtual Enterprise[J].Computers and Operations Research,2003,30 (2):213-231.
  • 6王刊良,孙利辉,王龙伟.一类供应商逆向选择问题的报酬机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,22(9):59-62. 被引量:13
  • 7[7]Weber C A,Current J R,Benton W C.Vendor Selection Criteria and Methods[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1991,50(1):2-18.
  • 8岑永霆.模糊质量功能展开[M].上海:上海科学技术文献出版社,1999..

二级参考文献9

  • 1[1]Eurostat. Sources and Resources for EU Innovation [R]. Brussels: European Communities, 2004.1-7.
  • 2[2]Hagedoorn J, Link A, Vonortas N. Research Partnerships [J]. Research Policy, 2000, 29:567-586.
  • 3[3]D'Aspremont C, Jacquemin A. Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers [J]. American Economic Review, 1988, 78:1133-1137.
  • 4[4]Kamien M I, Muller E, Zang I. Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels [J]. American Economic Review, 1992, 82(5):1293-1307.
  • 5[5]Morasch K. Moral Hazard and Optimal Contract Form for R&D Cooperation [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1995, 28:63-78.
  • 6[6]Akerlof G. The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84:488-500.
  • 7邵晓峰.库存管理的总趋势:JIT与MRP Ⅱ[J].管理现代化,1997,17(6):13-15. 被引量:7
  • 8韩坚,吴澄,范玉顺.供应链建模与管理的技术现状和发展趋势[J].计算机集成制造系统-CIMS,1998,4(4):8-14. 被引量:115
  • 9杨治宇,马士华.供应链企业间的委托代理问题研究[J].计算机集成制造系统-CIMS,2001,7(1):19-22. 被引量:57

共引文献86

同被引文献198

引证文献16

二级引证文献67

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部