民营企业上市方式、两权偏离度与现金持有价值被引量：8

Listing Types of Private Companies,the Deviation of Rights and the Value of Cash Holdings

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摘要本文对民营上市公司现金流量权和控制权的分离程度对现金持有量以及现金持有价值的影响进行了研究,并按照上市方式的不同对直接上市和间接上市两种类型中此种影响的差异性进行了比较分析。研究发现,随着两权偏离程度的增大,民营上市公司倾向于持有更多的现金;在间接上市的民营公司中,两权偏离程度对其现金持有量的影响更大;全样本中现金持有量与企业价值呈现出显著负相关的关系,而间接上市民营公司的现金持有的价值更低,两权偏离度对其现金持有价值的影响更大。 In this paper, we investigate the impact of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholder on the level and the value of corporate cash holdings of direct listed private companies and indirect listed private companies. Regression analysis indicates that the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is positively related to the level of corporate cash holdings ; the effect of the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights on the level of corporate cash holdings is significantly greater than that of the direct listed private companies; the level of corporate cash holdings is negatively related to the corporate value ; but the value of cash holdings are lower in the indirect listed private companies and the effect of the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights on the value of corporate cash holdings is significantly greater than that of the direct listed private companies.

作者李胜楠

机构地区天津大学管理学院会计与财务管理系

出处《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第3期101-109,共9页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基金国家社会科学基金项目"产品市场竞争对公司治理有效性影响的机理研究"(07CJY001) 天津市社会科学基金项目"我国上市公司过度投资形成机理及治理对策研究"(TJGL06-077)

关键词直接上市间接上市两权偏离现金持有量现金持有价值 direct listed private companies indirect listed private companies deviation of control rights from cash flow rights level of cash holdings value of cash holdings

分类号 F230 [经济管理—会计学]

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