摘要
以2008-2012年我国上市公司为样本,分别从关联交易整体和关联交易具体类型两个角度,研究了终极控制人对上市公司关联交易的影响,以及机构投资者对它们的作用。实证表明:终极控制人两权分离越大,关联交易规模就越大,且国有控股上市公司对关联交易的需求要高于非国有控股上市公司;机构投资者对其产生了制衡作用,其对国有控股上市公司的制衡要弱于非国有控股上市公司。国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司对三类关联交易的选择各有偏重,机构投资者对它们各自的制衡也存在差异。
From the perspectives of specific types of related party transactions and related party transactions as a whole, this paper samples China＇ s listed companies from 2008-2012, analyzing the influence of the ulti- mate controllers over the related party transactions of the listed companies and the role of institutional inves- tors in them. The study shows that the greater the two rights of the ultimate controllers diverge, the greater the scale of related party transactions is; it also displays that the state-owned listed companies have a higher demand for related party transactions than non-state-owned listed companies; institutional investors play the role of a check and balance, and their role over the state-owned listed companies is weaker than non-state- owned listed companies. State-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies have different preferences for the three kinds of related party transactions and the checks and balances the institutional in- vestors have over them are also different.
出处
《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期86-100,共15页
Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）
基金
国家社科基金项目(09BJY031)
上海教委科研创新重点项目(13ZS033)
关键词
终极控制人
机构投资者
关联交易
国有控股上市公司
非国有控股上市公司
ultimate controller
institutional investor
related party transaction
state-owned listed companiy
non-state-owned listed companiy
