摘要
本文以2000～2006年发生财务困境的480个观测数据为样本,检验国有产权与政府干预如何影响财务困境成本。我们以经行业中位数调整后的正常期间资产报酬率与困境期间资产报酬率的差额度量财务困境成本,检验发现:地区政府干预程度越高,公司财务困境成本越低;在政府干预程度较高的地区,国有公司的财务困境成本显著更低;但在政府干预程度较低的地区,国有产权对财务困境成本无显著影响。
The paper employs 480 samples from listed companies in distress between 2000 and 2006 and examines how state ownership and government intervention influences the costs of financial distress. We measure the costs of financial distress as the difference between the industry median adjusted ROA during the normal period and that during the financial distress period. We find that （1） stronger government intervention leads to lower costs of financial distress; （2） in regions whit strong government intervention, the costs of financial distress of state-owned companies are significantly lower; while in regions with weak government intervention, state ownership does not significantly influence the costs of financial distress.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期68-73,共6页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
国有产权
政府干预
财务困境成本
公司治理
State ownership
Government intervention
Costs of financial distress, Corporate govemance
