摘要
从经济学角度,运用博弈论的研究方法,通过建立一个以医院服务品质为内生变量的模型,对两种市场形态下定点医院的行为进行分析,得出结论:医保供方的准入规制会导致效率损失,并对制度的改进提出建议。
By theory of game,this paper constructs a model,which considers medical quality as its endogenous variable.Then it analyzes the regulation effectiveness of each fixed-point hospital in the least competitive situation and the most competitive situation.Resutls show that the entrance regulation of DHS is likely to bring quality damage.In the end,it brings some improved advice about medicare system
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第12期63-68,共6页
Soft Science
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(03JZD0022)
关键词
医疗供方
准入规制
医疗品质
medical supplier
entrance regulation
medical quality
