董事会里的“战争”——序贯与惩罚机制下董事会决策行为的实验分析被引量：12

War in the Boardroom: Experimental Studies on Sequential Decision-making, Penalty and Board Behaviors

下载PDF

导出

摘要本文利用实验研究方法首次在独立董事人数占优的董事会中引入序贯和惩罚机制,探讨了董事会科学决策的促成因素及制度环境。实验结果发现,序贯与惩罚机制引入后,董事决策正确率较静态实验分别提高了39.09%和34.26%,但两者的作用原理不同:序贯机制着力于改善董事会的私人信息结构,通过将独立董事"知情化",从而使决策行为独立于董事类型;惩罚机制则是利用独立董事的社会偏好进行治理,使决策行为与项目类型无关。与Gillette等人的研究结果不同,好项目的通过率并不是100%,原因可能与序贯时的针锋相对策略、惩罚时的社会偏好存在有关。 This paper introduces sequential decision-making and penalty into the board with dominative number of independent directors firstly employing experimental approach. We discuss the acceptable environment and the factors in which may in favor of rational behavior of the board. The results show, first, there is no more effective decision made in the board only and only if with dominative number of independent directors; second, with the sequential game and penalty the rate of rejection for bad program was up to 100%, this outcome is consistent with Gillette＇s results. As to the good program, the accepting ratio was 88.0% and 81.5% respectively. With the sequential game only, since the grim strategy in the shot term and tit for tat strategy in the long term by the directors, the accepting ratio of good program was not up to 100%. With the penalty, the exits of penalty with cost was the evidence of social preference of directors, this finding was not referred to in the Gillette＇s study. In conclusion, accuracy of board decisions increased 39.09% and 34.26% with sequential decision-making and penalty respectively. But the two institutions have different theories： sequential decision-making changes the information structure of the board; it could inform the independent directors to get both types of director make same decisions. Penalty can improve the accuracy of ＂insiders＂ when the project is bad by using independent directors＇ ;ocial preference. Good projects are not 100% passed because of titfor-tat strategy when sequential and social preference when penalty. That is different from the studies of Gillette.

作者李建标巨龙李政汪敏达

机构地区南开大学公司治理研究中心南开大学商学院

出处《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期70-76,共7页 Nankai Business Review

基金国家自然科学基金面上项目(70672029) 国家旅游局规划项目(09TAAG008) 国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001) 中国博士后科学基金面上项目(20080440665)资助

关键词独立董事序贯惩罚实验 Independent Directors Sequential Penalty Experinental

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献30

1艾·里斯,劳拉·里斯.董事会里的战争.太原:山西人民出版社,2009.
2张凡.关于独立董事制度几个问题的认识[J].管理世界,2003,19(2):90-98. 被引量：66
3李海舰,魏恒.重构独立董事制度[J].中国工业经济,2006(4):88-97. 被引量：33
4Daily, C., Dalton, D. CEO and Board Chairperson Roles Held Jointly or Separately: Much Ado About Nothing, Academy of Management Executive, 1997, (113): 11-20.
5Schellenger, M. H., Wood, D. D., Tashakori, A. Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth and Dividend Policy, Journal of Management, 1989, (15): 457-467.
6Pearce, J., Zahra, S. The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: Associations with Corporate Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 1991, (122): 135-153.
7Filatotchev, I., Bishop, K. Board Composition, Share Ownership, and 'Underpricing' ofU.K. IPO Firms, Strategic Management Journal, 2002, (23): 941-955.
8Ellstrand, A., Tihanyi, L., Johnson, J.. Board Structure and International Political Risk, Academy of Management Journal, 2002, (454): 769-777.
9Xie, X., O' Neil, H., Cardinal, L. Boards as Agents of Innovation: How Board Characteristics Affect R&D Intensity and R&D Performance in Research Intensive Firms. Paper Presented at Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA, 2003.
10Hutchison, M., Gul, F. Investment Opportunity Set, Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, (104): 595-614.