摘要
本文构建了一个考虑故意违约成本和信息差异的信贷模型。模型分析表明,导致贷款人拒绝某类担保能力不足企业贷款申请的真正原因在于贷款人关于企业信用品质信息不完全,而非其它;提高企业的故意违约成本可以改善企业融资状况;信息和社会资本因不同主体的差异导致信贷市场存在一定程度的市场分割和垄断,最具效率的信贷制度安排应该让最适合的主体来为企业提供贷款或担保。因此,政府对待民间金融的恰当政策应该是予以规范和扶持;以外部担保额作为甄别机制,政府担保只能作为一种特别的财政补贴方式。
In this paper, a model including information difference and deliberate default cost is set up. By using the model, we draw the following conclusions. The reason why a borrower class is redlined is the asymmetric information about the borrower＇s credit character, not others. Increasing the deliberate default cost can improve borrowers＇ financing condition. The differences between information and social capital endow the credit markets with character of segmentation and monopoly. The efficient credit system must assign appropriate lenders and guarantors to borrowers. The government should support and rule the civil financing. The premise of external guarantee as information screening institution includes marginal guarantee cost isn＇t zero and the lender knows it. The government guarantee can be implied just as special subsidy.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期29-39,共11页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
国家社会科学青年基金项目(批准号:07CJY059)
国家自然科学青年基金项目(批准号:70602033)
广东省科技厅项目(2007B080703005/07)的资助
关键词
信贷配给
信息甄别
违约成本
Credit Ration
Information Screening
Deliberate Default Cost
