摘要
企业间网络中的成员企业总是试图从合作企业中获取知识和能力,而又处心积虑地提防对方的类似行为,从而产生企业间网络中合作方之间重复性的博弈竞争问题。敲竹杠是企业间网络中遇到的最显著的投机行为,它与资产专用性有关,如何处理好敲竹杠行为是影响企业间网络顺利运行的关键问题。结合企业间网络中企业合作的特点,通过模型假设,运用定量分析方法着重分析敲竹杠行为产生的机理、引发的市场失灵及其效应,认为敲竹杠行为降低了成员企业的合作效率,网络中企业应在事前通过契约设定和制度设计积极预防敲竹杠行为。为此,分别从垂直一体化、契约条款界定自我履约、默认契约的自动实施等方面提出相应的治理策略,以期为治理企业间网络的这一投机行为提供决策借鉴。
In inter-firm networks, the members always attempt to acquire more and more knowledge and capacity from their parthers yet try to prevent their partners do like this at the same time, and it becomes a continuous game issue. Opportunism is unavoidable in inter-firm network and hold-up is the most typical case. It is related with asset specialty and how to solve this issue will influence the operation of inter-firm network. Combing with the characteristic of enterprises cooperation in the inter-firm net- work, this paper conducts a deeply analysis on the generation mechanism, marketing failure and the impact of hold up. It finds that the hold up will decrease the cooperation efficiency and the members should take some measures to prevent it from occurring through designing contract and system. On the basis of the above analysis, it puts forward corresponding countermeasures from the perspective of contact self-restrict, uprightness integration, auto implementation acquiescent contract and so on. We hope this work will provide some reference for the governance of the opportunism in inter-firm network.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期50-55,共6页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70602021
70773008
70403008)
国家社会科学基金(08CJY023
05CJY012)
国家软科学资助计划(2006GXS2B024)
中国博士后科学基金(20080430016)
北京市自然科学基金(9092015
9073019)
对外经济贸易"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目(33041)~~
关键词
企业间网络
敲竹杠
投机
治理
inter-firm network
hold-up
opportunism
governance
