摘要
在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈等三种博弈结构下建立了再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究和对比了不同市场力量结构对均衡回收率、批发价、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润的影响.研究结果表明:零售商的回收率在市场无领导者时最高,在零售商领导的市场中最低.批发价格在制造商领导时最高,最小的是零售商领导情形.零售价在零售商领导时最高,最小是市场无领导者情形.消费者和整个行业均受益于无领导者的市场结构.然而,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者.
The closed-loop supply chain game models with product remanufacturing are studied under three market structures, Manufacturer-Stackelberg market, Retailer-Stackelberg market, and Manufacturer and Retailer-Nash market. The optimal product return rates, wholesale price, retail prices, manufacturer and retailer＇s profits and total channel profits are analyzed under the three market power structures. The results show that the return rate is highest when there is no market leadership, lowest when Retailer is leader. The wholesale price is highest when Manufacturer is leader, lowest when Retailer is leader. The retail price is highest when Retailer is leader, lowest when there is no market leadership. The industry as a whole as well as consumer benefit from lower prices and larger profits when there is no market leadership. However, an individual member has an incentive to play the leader＇s role.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第8期28-35,共8页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
广东省自然科学基金(32206042)
关键词
再制造
闭环供应链
博弈
remanufacturing
closed-loop supply chain
game
