摘要
本文构建了创新技术商业价值信息不对称情况下在位创新厂商和生产厂商间的技术许可博弈模型,并运用逆向归纳法分别寻求混同均衡和分离均衡。分析结果表明,若运用两部制许可方式,从创新厂商的角度出发,当创新技术高经济价值的可能性较大时,高提成费用混同许可最优;当创新技术低经济价值的可能性较大时,低提成费用混同许可最优。此外,本文还得出固定费用许可条件下的最优许可策略。无论厂商选择何种许可方式,均不存在分离均衡。
In this paper,a licensing game between an innovation-holding firm and a potential licensee is analyzed under an asymmetric information framework on innovation value. The pooling equilibriums and separating equilibriums of the licensing game are found by backward induction. The result shows that：for high quality innovation with great probability, licensing by means of high magnitude royalty is the most profitable from the view of the innovation-holding firm; for low quality innovation with great probability, licensing by means of low magnitude royalty is superior. Fixed fee licensing schemes under asymmetric information are also considered. However, there is no separating equilibrium where technology license occurs.
出处
《技术经济》
2009年第7期7-10,26,共5页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(NCET-08-0772)
中国博士后科学基金项目(200603900501)
关键词
创新技术
许可策略
信息不对称
博弈模型
innovation technology
license strategy
asymmetric information
game model
