摘要
在原料供应厂商占据垄断地位的假设下,通过对比下游创新厂商提成特许前后的收益,对下游创新厂商的特许策略选择和创新激励进行了研究。研究结果表明:当技术创新规模较小时,下游创新厂商进行技术创新的激励增大,会对下游其他无创新的厂商进行技术特许;当技术创新规模较大时,下游创新厂商则不会进行技术特许。
Based on the assumption that the raw material suppliers work as the monopolizer in the supply market,this paper compares the profits of downstream manufacturers before and after getting licenses from technical innovators, and analyzes how the downstream innovator chooses its licensing strategy and what incentive it obtains. The results show that：if the scale of technological innovation is small, the downstream innovator will get enough incentives for innovation,and then will license its innovation to the downstream manufactures;if the scale of technological innovation is large,the downstream innovator will not do this.
出处
《技术经济》
2009年第1期27-30,56,共5页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
中国博士后科学基金项目"创新技术授权战略理论与方法研究"(200603900501)
关键词
垄断
创新激励
提成许可
duopoly
innovation incentive
royalty license
