摘要
电子商务环境下,以创新降低物流和库存等分销成本是零售商赢得生存与发展的重要途径,在渠道和谐和利润最大化的双重驱使下,策略性创新补偿成为制造商的首选策略。针对传统零售渠道与在线直销渠道的价格竞争,利用Stackelberg博弈,研究创新投入及其策略性补偿对混合渠道供应链的影响。结果表明,当零售商以创新投入降低其物流和库存等边际分销成本时,制造商将维持批发价和在线直销价不变,零售商将降低传统零售价,制造商和零售商的利润都得到改进;当制造商对零售商实施一定补偿以激励零售商进行更大的创新投入时,制造商将提高批发价并维持在线直销价不变,零售商将降低其零售价并增加创新投入,制造商和零售商的利润将得到进一步改善。因此,创新投入及其策略性补偿能实现混合渠道成员收益的Pareto改进。
It is very important for the retailer to invest innovation to reduce its logistic inventory operating cost, and it is the superior choice for the manufacturer to compensate the innovation cost with the drive of dual-channel coexistence friendly and the maximum profit. Aiming to the competition between the direct channel and the traditional channel in E-commerce, the paper studys the innovation and its strategic subsidy policy impact on the hybrid channels by Stackelberg game. It demonstrates that when the retailer invests innovation to reduce its operating cost, the manufacturer will keep its wholesale price and online price as before and the retailer will decrease its price. Therefore, the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer can both be improved. If the manufacturer can compensate innovation for the retailer, the manufacturer will choose higher wholesale price than the innovation alone and again keep the online price as before, while the retailer will decrease its price and increases investment in innovation. And hence the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer can both be improved again. As a consequence, it can be concluded that the investment in innovation and its strategic subsidy can realize the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer Pareto improvement in hybrid channels
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期17-26,共10页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70571088)~~
