摘要
本文指出政府对单个领域的公共政策可能会出现顾此失彼的结果,因为任何一项公共政策都很少只对单个领域内的经济主体或经济行为产生影响;不同政策之间还会交互作用,并使得公共政策的效果复杂化。本文从公共经济学的一般均衡理论和制度设计理论出发,建立了中国现有财政分权体制下的一般均衡理论框架,分析了城市低收入者住房的供应政策和基础教育入学政策对于城市居民区的交互作用和复杂效果,揭示出这两种政策的交互作用对于促成贫民窟的危险性。最后,本文提出了一系列降低中国城市社区贫民窟化风险的政策建议。
In many settings, policymakers are unable to restrict the effect of a particular policy to targeted economic agents or regulated economic behaviors only. Further, policies could interact with each other in the public domain thereby complicating implemented impacts. To illustrate this challenge we consider the issue of affordable housing provision which is getting increased attention from Chinese policymakers. We set up a Tiebout style general equilibrium framework to illustrate the impact of the affordable housing provision policies together with the public school admission policies on the community formation of urban China. We demonstrate the risks of ghettoizing urban Chinese landscapes from the interaction of the current housing policy and school admission policy, probably the unintended consequence by either policy, and make our recommendations to ways that would counteract those risks.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期28-39,共12页
Economic Research Journal
基金
"上海市重点学科建设项目(B101)"
"复旦大学中国国际竞争力研究基地985项目"的支持
关键词
同群效应
邻里效应
贫民窟化
经济适用房政策
基础教育入学政策
Peer Effects
Neighborhood Effects
Ghettoization
Social Housing Allocation Policies
School Admission Policies
