摘要
地方政府的行为深嵌于中央与地方以及地方与地方复杂交错的府际关系网络之中,并受制于国家宏观环境和微观制度安排的影响,表现为对地方利益最大化的理性追求。分析和消解地方政府阻碍区域协调互动的行为,应该在承认地方政府理性逐利人本性的基础上,从行为与制度的视角入手。本文通过Int-B-Ins模型的建构分析,对地方政府阻碍区域协调互动的行为与制度成因进行了深层解析,并着眼于促进区域协调互动提出引导地方政府优化行为的制度创新路径。
Restricted by the state＇s macro-system and micro-system, China＇s local governments are entangled in a web of complicated relationships between China＇s central government and local government, and among local governments, accordingly, they maximized interests of local governments. To analyze and eradicate local governments＇ behavior of hindering regional integration, it is necessary to recognize the nature of local government as an economic man from the perspective of behavioral and institutional analysis. By the model of Int-B-Ins, this paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the reasons of local government＇s hindering regional integration from the perspective of behavioral and institutional analysis and puts forward some policy countermeasures that it is necessary to optimize local governments＇ behavior for promoting regional integration by institutional innovation.
出处
《北京行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期12-17,共6页
Journal of Beijing administration institute
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(06CZZ008)
