摘要
本文运用重复博弈理论分析区域产业集群内多企业间合作性交易过程发现,当集群内形成第三方激励组织对企业间不合作行为惩罚大到永誓不会交易,甚至会被赶出集群时,就能激励集群内企业间合作从两企业向多企业合作发展。分析温州产业集群内商会组织发现,该组织能有效地监督集群内交易企业潜在的不诚实行为,为交易方提供一个合作激励机制,激励集群内多企业间的交易从欺骗均衡转到合作均衡,提升了集群的绩效和整体竞争力。
The application of repeated games theory on the cooperative transaction between the multienterprises in regional industrial clusters, it would be found that when the third party incentive tissue formed in the clusters makes penalty for the behavior of non--cooperation among the enterprises, when it comes to an oath means will not trade forever, even will be expelled from the clusters, so it can incentive the cooperation between the enterprises in the cluster to develop from the two enterprises to multi--enter- prises. Analysis of the chamber of commerce organization in the industrial cluster of Wenzhou showed that it would effectively supervise the dishonest behavior which potentially existed in the trade, provide the co- operative incentive mechanism ~or the traders, stimulate the trade between the multi--enterprises in the clusters from the deceptive equilibrium into cooperative equilibrium, furthermore enhance the performance and the whole competitiveness of the clusters.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第21期40-45,共6页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
重复博弈
产业集群
企业合作
激励机制
repeated games
industrial cluster
enterprise cooperation
incentive mechanism
