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建设时间和投资成本不对称的双寡头期权博弈模型 被引量:12

An Asymmetric Duopoly Option Game Model under Time-to-build and Investment Cost
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摘要 运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,在投资成本不对称的基础上引入建设时间不对称,采用逆向归纳法导出建设时间和投资成本同时不对称的双寡头企业投资期权博弈模型;对存在的抢先均衡、序贯均衡和同时投资均衡进行分析讨论,投资均衡分析表明,建设时间和投资成本都会对企业投资策略产生影响,对于每个企业而言能否成为领先者以及何时投资要视建设时间和投资成本的相对优劣势等具体情况确定,但努力建立建设时间和投资成本的相对优势会给企业带来更多投资先机;进一步分析建设时间和投资成本对投资策略的影响显示,与建设时间相比,投资成本对企业的投资临界值影响更大,因此企业应花费更多精力通过降低投资成本获得竞争优势。 Using asymmetric options duopoly game model, the asymmetry in the cost of the investment on the basis of the introduction of construction time asymmetry, by a reverse way constructs real option asymmetric duopoly game model under time-to-build and investment cost. Then three equilibriums such as preemptive, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium are discussed, and the results indicate that the time-to-build and investment cost have an important impact on firm's investment strategies. To every firm, whether or not to be leader and when to invest depend on its comparatively advantage and disadvantage between the time-to-build and in- vestment cost. However, efforts to establish the advantage on the time-to-build and cost of the investment is always the comparative advantages of enterprises will bring more investment opportunity. The time-to-build and investment cost on the impact of investment strategy analysis showed that compared with time-to-build, investment cost on the enterprises has a greater impact on the investment threshold, therefore firms should spend more energy by reducing investment costs to gain competitive advantage.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 2008年第4期75-81,共7页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(70473072)
关键词 期权博弈 投资决策 建设时间 投资成本 双寡头垄断 option game investment decision making time-to-build investment cost asymmetric duopoly
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