摘要
国有企业委托—代理关系的多重性质和转轨时期"内部人控制"问题的普遍存在,使得能否对国有企业经营者提供充分激励,关系到企业正常运作乃至整个国有企业改革的成败。转型期政府仍然保留改制后国企经营者的选择权和定薪权,根本上源自于国企利益相关者对国企初次收入分配的公平偏好和国企经营目标的多元性。国企改革面临的这些社会性约束是导致当前国企经营者激励处于制度性困境的根本原因。由于中国市场化改革的渐进性和国企制度变迁的路径依赖,这些社会性约束短期内难以根本消除,因而新时期国企经营者激励制度的改革和创新必须另辟蹊径。总的来说,要合理借鉴行为合约理论的相关成果,着眼于经营者期望互惠、公平偏好、利他主义和内在激励等非货币动机的培育和运用,努力探寻实现国企经营者敬业勤勉的可行路径。
In transition period, the government still owns the rights of choosing managers and determining their salaries in the reformed SOE （state-owned enterprise）. This institutional arrangement mainly arises from the constraints of SOE stakerholders＇ fair preferences and the multiplicity of SOE operational objectives. These social constraints lead to the dilemma of managers＇ incentive in the SOE. Because of the gradual process of china＇s marketnization reform and the path dependence of SOE institutional reform, These social constraints can not be removed in the short term. As a result, in order to reform and innovate managers incentives in the SOE, new approaches must be explored so that, based on the development of behavioral contract theory, non-pecuniary motives must be nurtured and leveraged and to fully motivate managers could be realized.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第8期72-78,共7页
Academic Monthly
基金
国家社科基金青年课题"所有制绩效问题研究"(批准号06CJL002)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
经营者
激励
困境
非货币动机
managers, incentive, dilemma, non-pecuniary motives
