摘要
本文在拓展卢克斯"权力维度"概念的基础上,构建了政治域中的主观博弈模型和不同域之间的演化博弈模型来探讨公共行政模式演化的一般路径,并通过分析公共行政模式演化路径背后政府与公民及官僚两两博弈,得出权力维度背后公共行政模式演化的一般规律:随着政治域中政府与公民及官僚间内在博弈规则的改变和不同域中共时性关联和历时性关联的演化,政府对公民及官僚权力维度将向纵深化发展。最后,提出了公共行政模式演化规律的几个命题及其对我国行政模式改革与发展的启示。
This paper based on analytical frame of evolutional game theory and depended on the concept of Luckes＇ power dimensionality discourses the evolutive path of public administration. Through investigated the play between government citizen and bureaucratic, we found the commonly rules of the evolutive path of public administration. With the game rules changed, the power dimensionality for citizen and bureaucratic more and more deepen. In the end we advanced some propositions of the rules of evolutive path of public administration, and revelations of China.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期112-117,共6页
Chinese Public Administration
关键词
权力维度
公共行政
博弈
power dimensionality, public administration, evolution, game
