摘要
累积创新是一种在先导创新基础上进行的后续创新,是对已有创新成果的进一步研究和应用。运用博弈理论分析研究发现,在累积创新框架下,动态联盟是实现累积创新的一种有效的组织形式。利益分配是影响动态联盟稳定运行的关键因素之一,是联盟各方绩效得以发挥的重要保证。建立动态联盟博弈时序下的利益分配模型,假设盟主对盟员具有完全谈判能力,对联盟各方的利益进行分析,得到累积创新中动态联盟最优的分配比例。
Accumulative innovation is the successive innovation based on the former innovation.It is a further application and study to the present innovation production.The paper proved that dynamic alliance is an effective organization to achieve accumulative innovation by game theory.Profit distribution is one of the important aspects which grant stable run of the dynamic alliance and it ensures every leaguer enterprises to act voluntarily.Suppose the hegemony enterprises were able to negotiate with the leaguer enterprise in a relatively favorable position,we analyze every interest aspect in the dynamic alliance.The paper sets the model of profit distribution when the cumulative innovation is in game theory,thus,we get the optimization in distributing profit.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第1期114-117,共4页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
关键词
累积创新
动态联盟
博弈论
联盟利益分配
accumulative innovation
dynamic alliance
game theory
profit distribution
