累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究被引量：62

Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the Cumulative Innovation:An Auction Model

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摘要本文通过构建累积创新框架下的拍卖模型来探讨知识产权制度的社会福利效应,比较各种具体制度的效率及在各种特殊的产业中的应用保护。基于存在领先厂商情况下累积创新过程中的创新竞赛问题的分析,可以得到三种不同策略情形下的社会福利函数,并确定知识产权保护程度的适用范围。研究结论的应用扩展表明:以生物技术、电子和医药等为主的行业,适用比较严格的保护制度进行保护,如专利制度;以计算机软件、音乐、书籍和期刊等为主的行业,适用比较宽松的保护制度进行保护,如版权制度。 This paper probes into the welfare effect of intellectual property rights and compares the efficiency of various concrete institutions,and also discusses the application in certain special industries by developing an auction model in the cumulative innovation. We study finns＇ innovation race in cumulative innovation with leader finn, and then obtain the social welfare function of three strategies and optimal intellectual property rights protection. Ultimately we draw the conclusion that industries such as biology technology, electronic and pharmacy are suitable for the strict institution, e. g. the patent; industries such as computer software, music, book and journal are suitable for the broad institution,e.g.the copyright.

作者董雪兵史晋川

机构地区浙江大学经济学院浙江大学民营经济研究中心

出处《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期97-105,共9页 Economic Research Journal

关键词累积创新知识产权拍卖模型 Cumulative Innovation Intellectual Property Rights Auction Model

分类号 F204 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献26

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