摘要
设计了一种先"拍卖"再"谈判"的两阶段采购机制,实现了更具分配效率且更符合实际的单物品采购运作。该机制设计的特色在于考虑到:采购业务中同时存在关于价格和质量的投标竞争与议价谈判,供应商与采购商在采购的不同阶段的私有信息披露问题,以及谈判阶段的时间成本和相应均衡策略问题。研究的基本结论是:在机制的拍卖阶段中,存在最佳近视反应意义下的招投标策略;机制的议价阶段在均衡路径上的分配结果,与买卖双方的真实价值具有重要的确定性关系;议价阶段实现了对拍卖阶段分配效率的改进,且买卖双方都存在关于质量和价格的贝叶斯纳什均衡议价策略与相关信念。
We design a two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical procurement operations,which implements first multi-attributes auction then bargaining.Main novelty of the mechanism is that we focus on three characteristics of practical procurement： both bidding and bargaining for price and qualities,both buyer and seller＇s information revelation problem,and time cost problem with corresponding strategies construction.We show that,the auction stage holds MBR（Myopic Best Response） incentive compatible for buyer and sellers.Also,allocation outcome on equilibrium path and its relationship with buyer and seller＇s real valuation is presented.Bargaining stage improves the efficiency of auction stage,especially;we show there exist Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies and corresponding beliefs for both players in the mechanism.
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期69-75,共7页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金(71002069
71071171
70701040)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CD-JSK100200
CDJSK100069)
重庆市科委自然科学基金计划资助项目(CSTC2010BB0041)
关键词
采购
拍卖
议价谈判
机制设计
贝叶斯均衡
procurement
auctions
bargaining
mechanism design
Bayesian equilibrium
