期刊文献+

Shapley value对信息共享产生收益的分配研究 被引量:9

Research on Allocation of the Profit from Information Sharing Based on Shapley Value
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摘要 研究当零售商的销售信息共享时,产生的经济收益及其分配问题。分别考虑了信息共享产生的收益存在和不存在边际效用递减的两种情况。研究发现,不考虑边际效用递减时,供应商得到的收益是参与信息共享联盟零售商数目的正比例函数,每个零售商的收益保持不变;如果考虑递减效用,供应商的收益增加的速度随着参与联盟的零售商数目的增加而递减,每个零售商得到的收益也递减。 The allocation of the economic benefit brought by sharing retailers' sales information is ivestigated. Situations with and without decreasing marginal utility are considered. The results show that without decreasing marginal utility, the supplier's utility is direcly proportional to the number of retailers in the union, and every retailer's utility is unchanged. With decreasing marginal utility, the increasing rate of supplier's utility is slow down with the number of retailers in the union, and every retailer's utility is decreasing.
出处 《工业工程与管理》 2008年第1期53-56,共4页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目(70732003)
关键词 供应链 信息共享 夏普里值 supply chain information sharing Shapley value
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参考文献7

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二级参考文献11

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