摘要
基于代建人与承包商的合谋的博弈研究,对代建合同中的成本激励系数的确定进行了分析,研究结论表明成本激励系数的确定必须防止代建人与承包商的合谋问题,成本激励系数应采用累进方式,同时,指出了代建合同中的成本激励系数的确定的适用范围。
Based on the study of the game of agent and contractor＇ s collusion, the cost incentive coefficient in the agent contract was analyzed. Research results indicate that the cost incentive coefficients were determined to be constructed to prevent the collusion of agent and contractor. Costs incentive coefficient should adopt a progressive manner. Meanwhile, the applied fields of the cost incentive coefficients in the agent contract were given.
出处
《重庆大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第11期135-138,156,共5页
Journal of Chongqing University
关键词
成本加酬金激励合同
成本激励系数
合谋
博弈
the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract
the cost incentive coefficient
conspiracy
game
