摘要
不确定型的行为控制较之确定型的行为控制更为复杂,但在现实中又有一定的广泛性,且目前的研究基础比较薄弱.把研究的视角放在不确定性回报下行为控制的博弈机理上,考察了博弈双方的行为观测偏差,定义了在信息不对称条件下管理者对被管理者的行为的观测矩阵、管理者的博弈策略矩阵、被管理者对管理者观测能力的估计矩阵及对管理者博弈策略的估计矩阵等,分析了管理者与被管理者之间的动态博弈过程和行为策略选择,给出了满足博弈均衡的不确定性回报的设计要求.这些都可以推广应用于各种具体管理制度的设计和改进当中,为行为控制研究提供了定量分析的新方法.在此基础上,选择房地产投资开发行为控制机制的实例进行了诊断研究.
Indefinite behavior control is more complicated than definite behavior control. And it is widely used in reality, however, the study on that is weak. This paper, from the perspective of indefinite return of behavior control, made a study of the behavior observation difference between the game two sides, and developed the concepts of governor＇s observation matrix, governor＇s game strategy matrix, member＇s estimation matrix of governor＇s observation, member＇s estimation matrix of governor＇s game strategy with asymmetric information as well. In the end the paper made an analysis of the dynamic game process and the behavior strategy selection between the governor and the member and put out the designing requirements for the game balance of indefinite return. All the findings above can be widely used in designing and the improvement of the management institution. This paper provided a new approach of quantity analysis for behavior control research. On basis of those above research, the paper made a diagnosis and case analysis of real estate investment behavior control institution.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第19期58-70,共13页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70271005
70471066)
上海市基础研究重点项目(03JC14054)
上海市教委计划立项课题(05SS09)
中央广播电视大学2007-2008年度"十一五"发展规划课题(CJ002)
关键词
行为控制
行为博弈
不确定性回报
信息不对称
action control
action game
uncertain return
dissymmetry of information
