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风险投资中双重委托代理风险的博弈分析 被引量:4

Analysis on the Playing of Dual Entrusting of Acting for the Risk in the Risk Investment
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摘要 风险投资体系中不同利益主体之间形成的双重委托代理关系能否顺利运作是决定风险投资成败的关键,然而该领域中的信息不对称问题远较一般行业严重,从而使其间形成的双重委托代理关系存在着巨大的风险性。不同利益主体之间可以达成一系列具有约束力的协议和制度安排,博弈各方都要严格遵守,这种合作博弈可以使各方均有持续、稳定的收益,达成不完全信息博弈的合作共赢,从而有效抑制双重委托代理风险。 Of the different benefits corpus become dual in the ate smoothly is a key that decides the risk investment success risk investment system entrrust to act for the relation can operor failure, however far more general profession of that information in the realm dissymmetry problem severity, thus make in the interval become dual to entrust to act for the relation to exist the huge risk. Of the different benefits corpus can reach the agreement and the system arrangements that a series have the binding force, the everyones of playing all want to obey strictly, this kind of cooperation playing can make everyone all keep on, stable income, reach incompletely the information playing of cooperation win totally, repress ths and effectively dual entrust the agency risk.
作者 王菲
机构地区 苏州大学商学院
出处 《经济研究导刊》 2007年第7期69-71,共3页 Economic Research Guide
关键词 双重委托代理 逆向选择 道德风险 博弈分析 dual entrusting of acting for converse choice moral risk analysis on playing
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