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知识型企业最优融资契约研究 被引量:1

Studies on Optimal Financing Contract in Knowledge-based Enterprises
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摘要 知识型企业作为人力资本与物质资本的一个合作契约,是一个不完全的契约。在知识型企业中人力资本所有者与物质资本所有者均有可能出现"道德风险",因而如何设计出一套方案能够同时激励人力资本所有者和物质资本所有者进行资产专用性投资便显得十分重要。从证券设计的角度来看,可转换证券可成为知识型企业的最优融资契约,它非常适合对人力资本所有者和物质资本所有者进行激励,它能够有效地平衡人力资本所有者和物质资本所有者对未来的投资期望。 Knowledge-based enterprises is a cooperative contract between human capital and physical capital. The cooperative contract of knowledge-based enterprises is an imperfect one. Because there exists moral hazard motivation between human capital proprietors and physical capital proprietors during the course of cooperation between them, it looks very important to design a set of project to promote them to make asset-specific investment. From the view of securities design, it is very suitable to use the properties of convertible securities to promote human capital proprietors and physical capital proprietors, which can balance their investment expectation for the future effectively and thus is used extensively.
作者 杨运杰
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第12期14-20,共7页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词 知识型企业 融资契约 可转换证券 Knowledge-based Enterprises FinancingContract Convertible Securities
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