摘要
银行是市场经济中极为特殊的一类企业,其治理模式及其演进也有别于其他企业。通过对美国商业银行历史的考察,我们发现美国商业银行治理模式的形成受到了危机和金融监管的巨大影响,进而表现出较为浓重的事前治理色彩,即监管部门充当关系型投资者的角色,对银行的日常运营进行较高程度的干预。近20年来,来自市场的并购与业绩敏感报酬等激励约束机制开始在美国的银行治理中发挥作用,出现了事前治理模式与事后治理模式的融合。美国商业银行治理模式的起源与演变不仅是经济效率取向变革的结果,而且也是根植于其特有的平民主义、联邦主义等政治传统以及相关利益集团的斗争,具有较为明显的国别特性。
According to a thorough analysis on the evolution of the modes of corporate governance of commercial banking in United States, this paper discovers that the crisis-oriented financial regulation had an great influence on the formation and evolution of the modes of corporate governance of commercial banking in U.S.. Contrast with other industries, the corporate governance of commercial banking in the United States is featured with en ante governance, that is to say, as a relationship-investor, the government intensively interfere with the functioning of the commercial banks. In recent 20 years there is a trend of mixture of en ante and ex governance in commercial banking. The paper confirms that the formation and evolution of the modes of corporate governance of commercial banking in U.S. isn＇t only the result of economic reforms with the aim to improve economic efficiency but also rooted in political traditions such as populism and federalism and the conflicts among interest groups.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第6期32-41,共10页
Studies of International Finance
关键词
美国商业银行
公司治理
历史演变
US Commercial Banking
Corporate Governance
Historical Evolution.
