摘要
本文通过分析国有企业经营者与所有者之间的博弈关系,构建了国有企业经营者的声誉模型,探讨了声誉对国有企业经营者的激励效应、以及声誉与国有企业经营绩效之间的关系。作者认为,一定时期内,在声誉效应的激励机制下,让国有企业经营者手中拥有企业的控制权对企业的运作是有效率的。
This paper analyzes the game relation between the operators and owners in state-owned enterprises, and constitutes a reputation model of state-owned enterprises＇operators. Then the paper discusses the reputation incentive effect to operators of state-owned enterprises, and explains the relation between the reputation and the performance of state-owned enterprises operation. The operation of state-owned enterprises will be effective when operators have controlling rights under the incentive effect of reputation during a period of time.
出处
《燕山大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2007年第2期118-122,共5页
Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Science
关键词
国有企业
经营者
声誉激励机制
state-owned enterprises
operators
reputation
incentive
game
