摘要
在外部性问题中,描述了外部性控制中管理当局将治污业务外包给排污企业模式下的价值函数,分析了不同信息条件下的外部性决策.在非对称信息条件下,把管理当局作为委托人,排污企业作为代理人,建立了外包的治污质量评价委托代理模型.考虑排污企业治污水平信息隐匿的情况,运用极大值原理推导了管理当局质量评价和转移支付的最优解,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果,得出了管理当局质量评价和转移支付的最优解.
Describes the value functions in the mode that the administration authorities have contracted with a firm for pollution control as an outsourcing business during externality control, then analyzes the decisions made on the extemality with different information. Taking the administration authorities as principal and the enterprise as agent, a proxy model is developed for the quality evaluation of pollution control as an outsourcing business based on asymmetric information. Considering that the firm may hide the information on its level of pollution control, the maximum principle is introduced to derive the optimal solutions to both the quality evaluation the authorities shall do and transfer payment, In this way the final optimal solutions are obtained to the quality evaluation and transfer payment through comparing those decisions made with different information.
出处
《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第3期454-456,共3页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
辽宁省教育厅高等学校科学技术研究项目(20040184)
关键词
外部性
非对称信息
外包模型
污染控制
委托代理
externality
asymmetric information
outsourcing model
pollution control
proxy
