摘要
本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的“公平博弈”概念植入现有委托—代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出“互惠性”非理性行为的新委托—代理模型。由该模型给出来的最优委托—代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托—代理最优合约更高的利润水平。研究发现,现有的Holmstrom—Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的。新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成。本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作。
By incorporating Rabin＇ s concept of fair gambling into the Principal——Agent model, this paper develops a new model featuring the irrational behavior of the agent＇ s showing reciprocity, whereby an agency agreement can be reached to maximize the benefit and produce a higher profit than from Holmstrom—Milgrom optimal Principa—lAgent contract. The new model can help to illustrate the humanization management of businesses and account for the development of this kind of corporate culture. The paper is an attempt to combine behavior economics and incentive mechanism theory and makes an innovative exploration into the construction of the structure of the information economics using behavior economics principle.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第3期5-11,共7页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
