基于不完全非合作博弈的上市公司违规行为分析被引量：8

Analysis of China Listed Companies′ Violations Based on Incomplete and Non-Cooperative Game

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摘要频频发生的上市公司违规实际上是不同利益主体之间博弈的结果。违规上市公司涉及的利益主体主要是控股股东、中小股东与监管者,他们之间的博弈是不完全、非合作博弈。本文建立了违规上市公司及其控股股东与中小股东、监管者之间的博弈模型,发现了影响上市公司及其控股股东违规概率高低的主要因素是制度安排、违规成本与监管力度等,在此基础上提出了建立利益相关者共同治理的治理结构、立法保护利益相关者利益、实施对监管者监管等有效治理上市公司违规行为的政策建议。 Frequent violations of listed companies in China are the result of games between different stakeholders. The main stakeholders of listed companies are holding shareholders, minority shareholders and regulators. The games between them are incomplete and non-cooperative. This paper constructs a game model between holding shareholders, minority shareholders and regulators, discovers the main factors that influence violations＇ probability of listed companies and their holding shareholders, such as system arrangement, violation cost and supervise power etc. At last, this paper brings forward some policy recommendations to govern the listed companies＇ violations effectively, such as setting up stakeholders co-governance, protecting stakeholders by making laws, and supervising the supervisor.

作者王军伟

机构地区南京审计学院管理学院

出处《财贸研究》北大核心 2006年第6期94-100,共7页 Finance and Trade Research

基金江苏省教育厅哲学社会科学基金项目(06SJD63043) 南京审计学院院级科研项目(NSK2006/B10)

关键词上市公司违规行为不完全博弈非合作博弈公司治理 listed companies violations incomplete game non-cooperative game corporate governance

分类号 F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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