摘要
群落中企业创新行为具有网络外部性的效应,为此创新行为的组织方式有必要采取集群式组织创新。在此基础上运用进化博弈思想,构建了2×2对称型博弈和3×3非对称型博弈模型。模型研究表明,群落中企业创新行为具有协同竞争性,同时还证明了这种协同竞争创新行为具有很强的进化稳定性。
Each enterprise often confronts with these problems whether it need to make innovation investments or cooperate with others in enterprise clusters. This paper looks upon innovation behavior game as evolution game, and constructs two game models： a Hawk-Dove game and a expandable model based Hawk-Dove game. The results show that there is the evolutionary stable character of synergic competition when corporation make innovation investments in enterprise clusters. Finally, this paper proves that innovation behavior possess evolutionary stability.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期52-55,70,共5页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
关键词
网络外部性
创新行为
对称型博弈
进化稳定策略
network externality
innovation behavior
symmetry game
evolutionary stable strategies
