摘要
供应链中的业务外包策略充分发挥了供应链节点企业的核心竞争力,但同时存在产品质量难以控制的问题。本文通过构建以价格折扣和质保金为参数的契约模型,分析了制造商在非对称信息条件下对业务外包产品进行质量控制的最优契约设计问题。
The outsourcing decision can sufficiently utilize the core competencies of each node in supply chains, but there is a problem of production's quality control. This paper studies the optimal contract design problem of a manufacturer outsourcing in the presence of information asymmetry and establishes a model focusing on two compensation schemes embedded in the contract, namely, price rebate and warranty.
出处
《物流科技》
2006年第8期78-81,共4页
Logistics Sci-Tech
关键词
供应链
契约设计
质量控制
委托-代理理论
supply chain
contract design
quality control
principal-agent theory