摘要
研究了非对称信息下供应链的质量预防决策问题,建立了供应商和销售商的质量收益函数,重点考虑了非对称信息下的决策问题已经变成最优控制问题,运用极大值原理推导了销售商产品评价信息隐匿情况下供应商的质量预防的最优解,并进行了仿真计算.
Supply chain quality prevention decision problem is studied under asymmetric information. Supply chain quality profit models are set up with regards to seller and supplier. Focus is on the study of decision problem turned into optimal control problem under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to supplier quality prevention when seller evaluation information is hidden. Simulation calculation is done and simulation results under different information backgrounds are compared .
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第12期95-99,共5页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
辽宁省自然科学基金(9910200208)
关键词
商品销售
供应商
销售商
供应链
质量预防决策
非对称信息
asymmetric information
supply chain
principal agent
maximal principle
prevention
evaluation
