摘要
风险投资过程中,由于信息的不对称,投资者与风险投资家之间、风险投资家与风险企业家之间存在着双重逆向选择风险。在融资阶段的信号传递机制中,作为代理人的风险投资家,选择融资计划书信号,向作为委托人的投资者传递其能力信号,投资者据此修正自己的先验概率,然后根据后验概率,与风险投资家签定合同规避风险;在投资阶段的信息甄别机制中,作为中间委托人的风险投资家先提供合同,这时唯一可能是分离均衡,即不同类型的风险企业家选择不同的合同规避风险。
In the process of venture capital investment, double adverse selection risk exists between investors and venture capitalists, venture capitalists and venture capital entrepreneurs because of the asymmetrical distribution of information. In the signaling mechanism of financing phase, the venture capitalists, who are the agents, offer information about their ability to the investors, who are the principals. The investors adjust their prior belief according to the information, and then sign contacts with the venture capitalists according to posterior belief so as to avoid adverse selection risks. In the screening mechanism of investing phase, the venture capitalists, who are the principals now, offer contacts first. At this moment, the only possibility is to separate equilibrium, that is, different types of venture entrepreneurs chose different contacts with the purpose to avoid adverse selection risks.
出处
《长安大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第2期56-60,共5页
Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition)
基金
陕西省教育厅重点资助项目(2005JS65)
关键词
风险投资
信息不对称
逆向选择
风险规避机制
venture capital
information asymmetry
adverse selection
risk avoiding mechanism
